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COMMENTS
Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering
Enterprise Injury Requirement
INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act,1 entitled "Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ' 2 [hereinafter RICO],
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). This act was enacted by Congress in 1970 and
was supplemented in 1976. The statute provides in its relevant part:
(1) "Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from inter-
state shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions, section 1084 (relating to the trans-
mission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), sec-
tion 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction ofjustice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), sec-
tion 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), sec-
tion 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments, section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gam-
bling businesses), section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which
is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with re-
strictions on payments and loans to labor organizations), or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying sell-
ing, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable
under any law of the United States;
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(4) "Enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" requires at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity, one of which occurred, after the effective date of this chapter and
the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
§ 1962. Prohibited Activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or
1
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was enacted for the purpose of "seek[ing] the eradication of organ-
ized crime in the United States."' 3 RICO provides "enhanced sanc-
tions' 4 and new criminal5 and civil remedies6 to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.7 The civil
component8 of RICO (hereinafter "Civil RICO") supplements the
traditional penal method of recourse by allowing victims of specific
criminal activity to bring a civil cause of action against the RICO
offender.
Civil RICO has stirred a storm of judicial controversy because a
broad reading of the RICO statute9 would provide plaintiffs stand-
ing to sue in the federal courts for treble damages,10 attorney's fees,
and court costs11 almost any time they can allege injury caused by
the commission of two or more of the racketeering acts listed in
RICO.12 Racketeering activity,13 referred to by the courts as "pred-
icate acts," includes many state and federal offenses ranging from
murder, kidnapping and drug trafficking to mail, wire and securi-
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. . . to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
4. Id.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). See supra note 2. For an excellent analysis of the
criminal provisions of RICO, see Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
7. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
9. Specifically, it is a broad reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note
2.
10. Damages given by statute in certain cases, consisting of the single damages
found by the jury, actually tripled in amount. BLACK'S DICTIONARY 1347 (rev. 5th ed.
1978).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
13. Id.
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ties fraud. The commission of any two predicate acts14 or two com-
missions of any one predicate act,15 done in furtherance of a
business or an association1 6 invokes Civil RICO, providing anyone
injured by such conduct a civil remedy. 17 As a result of the inclu-
sion of various frauds 18 in the list of predicate acts, an unrestricted
application of Civil RICO sweeps broadly, affecting not only mem-
bers of organized crime but also ordinary white collar criminals.
Consequently, judicial discomfort with the potential breadth of
Civil RICO has prompted the courts to impose various standing
requirements' 9 on those plaintiffs seeking damages. The standing
requirements imposed on the Civil RICO plaintiff allow only those
plaintiffs who allege a certain type of injury to sue in the federal
courts 20 for treble damages. While the standing requirement2' em-
ployed by the court may differ as to the type of injury the plaintiff
must allege, all have the same effect of restricting the application of
Civil RICO to a limited class of defendants.
The judicially created standing requirements22 most frequently
invoked by the courts are: an organized crime nexus, 23 a competi-
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (Definition of "Pattern of Racketeering Activity").
See supra note 2.
15. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (Definition of "Enterprise"). See supra note 2.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
18. The courts consistently refer to mail, wire, and securities fraud collectively as
"garden variety fraud." See, eg., Hulse v. Halle Farms Dev., 586 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D.
Conn. 1984).
19. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
21. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
22. These standing requirements have also been referred to as a proximate cause
requirement. In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co. See. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388,
1430 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See also Teltronics Serv., Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F.
Supp. 724, 732-33 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
23. Although an organized crime nexus has not traditionally been considered a
standing issue by the courts, the effect of this requirement is analogous to a standing
requirement in that it requires the Civil RICO plaintiff to be injured "by reason of"
organized crime. To satisfy this pleading requirement, the Civil RICO plaintiff must
show an injury resulting from the defendant's affiliation with a criminal organization.
The overwhelming majority of courts have rejected the organized crime nexus. See,
Sutcliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984); Moss v. Morgan Stan-
ley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287-88 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343,
1353 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1984); Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983);
Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99, 674 at 97,713
(C.D. Cal. 1984); Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415,
1425-26 (D. Or. 1984); Furman v. Cirrito, 578 F. Supp. 1535, 1538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 339, 348 (D.N.J. 1983); Yancoski v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 n.18 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Slattery v. Costello, 586
F. Supp. 162, 165 (D.D.C. 1983), Mooney v. Fidelity Union Bank, Nos. 82-3192, 82-
3
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tive injury,24 an infiltration injury,25 or a racketeering enterprise in-
3193 slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1983); In re Longhorn See. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255,
269 (W.D. Old. 1983); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Taylor v. Bear & Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 681-82 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Action
Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 850-51 (E.D. Va. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen,
571 F. Supp. 714, 719-20 (D.D.C. 1983); Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l
Bank, 571 F. Supp. 489, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Mich 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1578-79 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40,
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Wind-
sor Assoc., Inc. v. Greenfield, 564 F. Supp. 273, 278-79 (D. Md. 1983); Hunt Int'l
Resources Corp. v. Binstein, 559 F. Supp. 601, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lode v. Leo-
nardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kaushal v. State of India, 556 F. Supp.
576, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47,
49 (N.D. Cal. 1982); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 230-31 (M.D. Pa. 1982);
Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D. N.Y.
1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
Harper v. New Japan Sec., Int'l., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Spencer
Co. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,
361 at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1982); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa
1981); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978); Accord
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 284-85 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Blakey, Reflections].
24. Some courts have required a Civil RICO plaintiff to show a competitive injury
in order to attain standing. The term competitive injury is one borrowed from antitrust
law. Those courts that apply a competitive injury requirement rely on the fact that the
Civil RICO treble damage clause is patterned after antitrust law and they rely on the
Statement of Findings and Purpose which prefaces RICO stating it was intended to
protect "legitimate businesses from organized crime infiltration" and to preserve "free
competition." Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See also Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101, 1109-12
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Civil RICO]. The effect of the competitive injury
requirement as applied to the Civil RICO plaintiff is to grant standing only to those
injured indirectly as competitors and to deny standing to those injured directly from the
predicate acts. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th cir. 1983).
However, the majority of courts and commentators have rejected the application of
the competitive injury requirement to Civil RICO plaintiffs. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown,
711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88,
92 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 165-66 (D.D.C. 1983); Mu-
nicipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., No. 81-347, slip op. at 3-4 (March 18,
1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 270 (W.D. Old. 1983); Ralston v.
Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Wilkinson v. Paine, Webber, Jack-
son & Curtis, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 23, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,198 at 95,797 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240-41 (S.D. N.Y. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347,
1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 564 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 230 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Hanna Mining v.
Noreen Energy Resources, Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,742 at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 680 (D. Del. 1982); Helenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn,
1985]
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jury.26 A majority of courts have rejected the first three standing
requirements set out above,27 and there remains a sharp division
among the courts concerning the last standing requirement: a rack-
eteering enterprise injury. 28
523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Blakey, Reflections, supra note 23, at 237
(1982).
One factor considered by the courts rejecting the competitive injury requirement is
the report issued by the antitrust division of the American Bar Association. The report
advocated that RICO should not supplement the antitrust law, but should be separate
legislation. The report stated that the use of antitrust laws as a vehicle for combatting
organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of
persons injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage recovery. Such a
private litigant would have to contend with a body of precedent-appropriate in a
purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on questions such as "standing to
sue" and "proximate cause." S.1623 and S.1624, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC.
6995 (1969) (Sen. Hruska). See also Cong. Rec. 9567 (1969) (Sen. McClellan) (no intent
to incorporate complexity of antitrust principles). In light of the ABA's report, sepa-
rate legislation was enacted. Professor G. Robert Blakey, who served as chief counsel of
the Senate Subcommittee of Criminal Laws and Procedures when these RICO bills were
processed, concluded "any suggestion that RICO action be limited by antitrust type
limitations-'competitive,' 'commercial,' or 'direct/indirect' injuries-flies in the face of
the very considerations that led to the drafting of RICO as a separate statute from the
antitrust statutes that are so limited." Blakey, Reflections, supra note 23, at 237, 255
n.52 (1982).
Furthermore, the goals behind the two statutes are vastly different. Civil RICO and
the antitrust laws are "not coterminous." Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059. On a
very simplistic level, "fostering free competition is the purpose of the antitrust laws,
while only an ancillary purpose of RICO." Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1433 (E.D.
Pa. 1984). RICO "was broadly aimed at striking. . . a mortal blow against the prop-
erty interest of organized crime." Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357-58 (7th Cir.
1983) (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 602) (1970) (Sen. Hruska). The competitive injury
requirement prevents frivolous suits from undermining the purpose behind the antitrust
laws which is the promotion of competition. This safeguard is misplaced in the applica-
tion of Civil RICO because the economic ruin of an enterprise which operates through a
pattern of racketeering is the very purpose behind section 1964(c). In short, "there are
few countervailing reasons to lessen the impact of remedies on Civil RICO defendants
as there might be in a typical antitrust case": Blakey, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
1009, 1042 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Blakey, Basic Concepts].
25. Less than a handful of courts have held that standing is restricted to legitimate
enterprises "infiltrated" through a pattern of racketeering activity. Spencer Co. v.
Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RFP. (CCH)
98,361 (E.D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1982); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII)
98, 772 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982).
26. Racketeering enterprise injury, aka "distinct injury," "special injury," "enter-
prise injury," "racketeering injury" and "by reason of injury."
27. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
28. Roughly half of the courts dealing with the issue have rejected the racketeering
enterprise injury requirement. Furthermore, it appears to be the trend to recognize the
meaninglessness of the racketeering enterprise injury. See, e.g., Haroco, Inc. v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 387-9 (7th Cir. 1984); Alexander Grant & Co. v.
Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d
524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed; Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1359
(7th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton, 597 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ohio, 1984); Berg v.
First Am. Bank Share, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, (D.D.C. 1984); Joseph v. Algemene Bank
Nederland, 592 F. Supp. 141, 147 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-
Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1539 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F.
5
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This Comment will examine the racketeering enterprise injury
standing requirement and show that there is no such requirement in
Civil RICO's legislative history nor in its express language. Part I
will trace the evolution of the racketeering enterprise injury. Part II
will examine the definitions given by the courts of a racketeering
enterprise injury. Part III will scrutinize and reject the justifica-
tions given by those courts for requiring a racketeering enterprise
injury. Part IV will discuss In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Inc., Securities Litigation,2 9 the most comprehensive and well-rea-
soned case to date, which addresses and rejects the racketeering en-
terprise injury requirement. Finally, Part V will emphasize why a
racketeering enterprise injury is an artificial requirement and will
Supp. 561, 569 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp. 945, 952 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Swanson v.
Wabash, 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1319-20 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel. Corp.,
576 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88,
97 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Austin v. Merrill Lynch, 570 F. Supp. 667, 669 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Slattery v. Costello,
586 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D.D.C. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F.
Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach.
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (D.N.J. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476,
495 (E.D.Pa. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Windsor Assoc., Inc. v. Greenfield, 564 F. Supp. 273, 279 (D. Md. 1983); Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Meineke
Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
The courts that require the plaintiff to prove a racketeering enterprise injury are as
follows: Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), 741
F.2d 482, 494 (2d Cir 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No.
84-648); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1984); White v.
Fosco, No. 81-2500, slip op. (D.D.C. 1984) Carbone, Inc. v. Proctor Ellison Co., 102
F.R.D. 951 (D. Mass. 1984); Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dade Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 592 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-93 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v.
Gramercy Realty Assoc., 591 F. Supp. 1408, 1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Rush v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reyo-
nold, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Clute v. Davenport Co., 584 F.
Supp. 1562, 1569 (D. Conn. 1984); Margolis v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 585 F. Supp. 595,
596 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445, 451
(D. Or. 1984); Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368,
1376 (D. Mass. 1984); Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984);
Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 583 F. Supp. 780, 787 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Kaufman v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Willamette Say. &
Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984); Hudson v.
Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F.
Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Va. 1983); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 579 F. Supp. 423, 428 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983); Dakis on behalf of Dakis Pension Plan v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 761
(N.D. Cal. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983); Waste
Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Barker v.
Underwriters at Lloyds, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Bulkferts, Inc. v.
Salatin, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 6, 9 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp.
281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002,
1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
29. 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984) cited with approval in Alexander Grant &
Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984) and in Haroco, Inc. v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 1984).
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conclude that the Civil RICO plaintiff should only have to allege
injury from the predicate acts for standing to sue in the federal
courts.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE
INJURY REQUIREMENT
The evolution of the racketeering enterprise injury begins in Con-
gress' attempt "to strike a mortal blow" 30 against organized crime
through the enactment of Civil RICO. The aggressive measures
taken by Congress reflect the realization that criminal organizations
possess an overwhelming amount of money and power 31 and are
using these resources to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate busi-
nesses. 32 Congress was concerned that our democratic and eco-
nomic systems were gradually being subverted by these criminal
forces. 33 In response to this threat, Congress acted drastically in its
adoption of Civil RICO by providing the private civil litigant a
powerful tool to attack the lifeline of organized crime-its profits. 34
Civil RICO operates to take the profit incentive out of organized
crime by awarding the victim treble damages. This new remedy
furthers Congress' goal, the eradication of organized crime,35 by de-
pleting the assets of criminal organizations and thereby impeding
their ability to influence and corrupt society.
While the intended purpose of Civil RICO was the abolition of
organized crime,36 Congress was aware that a law targeted solely at
organized crime would be unconstitutional. 37 Representative Poftf38
argued that any statute aimed at the status of an individual would
be constitutionally suspect in light of the Supreme Court's consis-
tent invalidation of statutes that create status offenses or that make
it unlawful to be a member of certain organizations. The amend-
ment proposed by Representative Biaggi39 suggesting that the bill
30. 116 CONG. Rc. 602 (1970) (Statement of Sen. Hruska).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (The Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
32. Id. See also 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (Sen. Hruska).
33. Id.
34. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong. Ist Sess. 79 (1969) (Sen. McClellan)
What is needed ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individu-
als, but also with an economic base to which those individuals constitute such
a serious threat to the economic well-being of the nation ... [a]n attack must
be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take
place on all available fronts.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-923 (1970) (The Statement of Findings and
Purpose).
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
38. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 293 (1970) (Statement of Rep. Poft.
39. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 343 (1970) (Statement of Rep. Biaggi).
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be tailored to outlawing membership in the Mafia or in La Cosa
Nostra was rejected by Congress. Accordingly, the enactment of
Civil RICO did not create a status offense but rather created a con-
duct offense. A statute aimed at conduct affects all individuals
equally who, regardless of their affiliations, engage in the proscribed
activity. Further evidence that Civil RICO is a law geared toward
conduct is the fact that it was enacted over specific objections that
its reach went far beyond organized crime.4° These objections were
voiced by Senators Philip A. Hart and Edward M. Kennedy when
the predicate acts listed in RICO were expanded to include mail,
wire, and securities fraud.41 These predicate acts bring ordinary
white collar criminals within the scope of Civil RICO. Therefore,
Congress' intent not to limit the application of Civil RICO to or-
ganized crime is evidenced by the express language of Civil RICO
and by the comments of those who did not fully support the bill.
Despite the clear legislative intent to extend the application of
Civil RICO beyond members of organized crime, some courts have
been reluctant to do So. 4 2 These courts are hesitant to inflict treble
damages upon defendants who are not typically considered mem-
bers of criminal organizations. To alleviate their judicial discomfort
in applying Civil RICO to white collar criminals, these courts have
imposed stringent standing requirements43 on plaintiffs seeking to
sue under Civil RICO. The court's imposition of one such standing
requirement, the racketeering enterprise injury,44 requires the plain-
tiff to allege injury from the enterprise instead of merely alleging
injury from the predicate acts.45
The court's requirement of a racketeering enterprise injury is the
most frequently litigated issue46 regarding the application of Civil
RICO today. The opposing views are: those who advocate restrict-
ing the use of Civil RICO by requiring a racketeering enterprise
injury and those who oppose limiting the application of Civil RICO
and instead require only injury from the predicate acts.
As the racketeering enterprise injury requirement has evolved in
the courts, it has been applied inconsistently and sporadically. This
difficulty in application is due, at least in part, to the fact that the
courts have not been able to define this concept precisely. It would
be appropriate to analyze the definitions currently attached to the
40. See infra note 41.
41. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
42. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 26.
45. For an example, see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 28.
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racketeering enterprise injury by those courts requiring such an
injury.
II. THE DEFINITIONS OF A RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE INJURY
No court has offered a practical or tangible definition of what is
meant by a racketeering enterprise injury.4 7 Moreover, very few
courts have even attempted to define this nebulous requirement.48
One court appropriately stated that a racketeering enterprise injury
is a "slippery concept whose definition has eluded even those courts
professing to recognize it. ' '49
To illustrate this point, in Willamette Savings & Loan v. Blake &
Neal Finance Co. o the court conceded that it was a difficult task to
define a racketeering enterprise injury, but nevertheless proclaimed
that courts will recognize "a racketeering enterprise injury when
they see one."' 51 Justice Stewart's well known observation regarding
pornography was relied upon by the Willamette court:
I shall not attempt to further define the kind of material I under-
stand to be embraced within the shorthand description (i.e.,
hardcore pornography); and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligently doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the mo-
tion picture involved in this case is not it.52
This paraphrase of Justice Stewart's observation seems inappro-
priate for use in the application of Civil RICO. What constitutes
pornography is determined by individual and societal morals. This
standard fluctuates from community to community and is changed
by the passage of time. In contrast, the prerequisites for a Civil
47. Some courts have imposed a racketeering enterprise injury requiremnt on civil
RICO plaintiffs without explaining what is meant by the requirement. See Hudson v.
Larouche, 579 F. Supp. 1535, 1539-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, No. 84-7113, slip op. (2d
Cir. July 27, 1984); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Guerrero
v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
48. See Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1436 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (racketeering enterprise
injury is a "catch-all" term); Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F.
Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984) (courts will recognize a racketeering enterprise injury
when they see one); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (racketeering enterprise injury is a competitive injury); Johnson v.
Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (a racketeering enterprise injury is a
commercial injury); Landmark Sav. Loan v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206,
208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (defined racketeering enterprise injury by way of an
example).
49. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984).
50. 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984).
51. Id. See also Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
52. Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D.
Or. 1984) (quoting from Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)).
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RICO plaintiff to gain standing to sue should be consistent through-
out the United States. Injury "by reason of' 53 should not be a sub-
jective determination based on a pliable, evolving standard, but
should be an objective determination applied to the facts of each
case. Thus, analogizing a RICO injury54 to the definition of por-
nography results in the illusory requirement of a racketeering enter-
prise injury being used to deny standing to the direct victims of
racketeering activity.
Another court55 attempted to define a racketeering enterprise in-
jury by way of an illustration: "An injury might be found where a
Civil RICO defendant's ability to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by
infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering activity into the
enterprise. '5 6
This example does nothing by way of providing a concrete defini-
tion of a racketeering enterprise injury and "does even less in terms
of limiting the statute's reach since almost every defendant's ability
to inflict harm on a plaintiff would be enhanced by the fruits of
racketeering activity."157 It seems any plaintiff that alleges a viola-
tion of section 196258 and an accompanying injury would satisfy
this example. In effect, this purported illustration of a racketeering
enterprise injury is consistent with the reading of Civil RICO em-
ployed by the courts that reject a special injury requirement.
Other courts59 have defined a racketeering enterprise injury as a
"different sort of injury than injury from the predicate acts"; 60
other courts have defined it as an injury which possesses "some-
thing more than the injury resulting from the. . . predicate acts." 61
These courts, however, have failed to explain what is meant by a
"different sort of injury" 62 or what constitutes "something more" 63
than injury resulting from the predicate acts. In sum, the only fea-
ture of a racketeering enterprise injury which the courts have been
able to articulate is that a racketeering enterprise injury does not
53. "Injury by reason of" a violation of § 1962 as proscribed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
54. In other words, a "racketeering enterprise injury."
55. Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09
(E.D. Mich. 1981). The court also noted that racketeering enterprise injuries and com-
petitive injuries are not identical; however, it conceded to the existence of an overlap
between the two types of injuries. Id. at 209.
56. Id.
57. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1984).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). See supra note 2.
59. See infra note 64.
60. K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) %
99,423 at 96, 429 (D. Colo. June 30, 1983).
61. King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
62. See supra note 60.
63. See supra note 61.
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include injuries flowing from the commission of the predicate
acts.6 Since these courts cannot sufficiently define a racketeering
enterprise injury it becomes necessary to examine how these courts
justify the imposition of a racketeering enterprise injury
requirement.
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS GIVEN BY THE COURTS FOR
REQUIRING A RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE INJURY
There are several justifications given by those courts interpreting
Section 1964(c) 65 to require a racketeering enterprise injury. These
justifications include: (1) the analogy to antitrust law whereby a
distinct injury is required; (2) the assertion that Congress did not
intend to federalize pre-existing state law, nor did they intend to
supplement the substantive statutes constituting racketeering activ-
ity; (3) the court's concern over crowded dockets; and (4) the plain
language of Civil RICO requires a racketeering enterprise injury. 66
The first justification given by some courts for requiring a racke-
teering enterprise injury is based on a general analogy to antitrust
law. The legislative history of Civil RICO67 makes reference to an-
64. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(racketeering enterprise injury is "something more than direct injury from the predicate
acts"); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9
99, 423 at 96,429 (D. Colo. June 30, 1983) (racketeering enterprise injury requires "a
different sort of injury than injury from the predicate acts"); King v. Lasher, 572 F.
Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("the injury which triggers RICO must be something
more than the injury resulting from the alleged underlying predicate acts"); Erlbaum v.
Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 98, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
("must allege something more than an injury from racketeering activity"); Landmark
Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("stand-
ing to bring a Civil RICO damage action [requires] an allegation that the plaintiff has
suffered a racketeering enterprise injury, i.e., something more or different than injury
from the predicate acts").
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
66. Courts on both sides of the racketeering enterprise injury dispute have claimed
that they are merely following the "plain" meaning of section 1964(c). Compare Bank-
ers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516, (2d Cir. 1984) (plain meaning requires a
distinct RICO injury), and Haroco v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 577 F. Supp. 111,
113-14 (N.D. III. 1983) ("this RICO injury requirement is. . .supported by the plain
language of the statute"), with Furman v. Cirrito, 711 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984)
("language is clear and does not require racketeering injury"). In Clute v. Davenport,
584 F. Supp. 1562, 1570-71 (D. Conn. 1984), the court admitted that the plain meaning
of the statute did not require a racketeering enterprise injury, but nevertheless advo-
cated requiring one:
A literal interpretation of the statute might lead one to the conclusion that a
defendant is civilly liable under RICO merely upon the showing that he has
committed any two of the predicate offenses. Such a reading, I believe, would
be in error because it fails to recognize that Congress meant to limit redress to
injuries caused by racketeering.
67. At 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) Senator Hruska states: "Patterned closely
after the Sherman Act (RICO) provides for private treble damage suits prospective in-
junctive relief, discovery procedures and all the other devices which bring to bear the
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titrust principles, for example, the Civil RICO treble damage
clause68 was modeled after the Clayton Antitrust Act.69 A few
courts70 have seized upon these antitrust references as evidence that
Congress intended to impose on Civil RICO plaintiffs standing re-
quirements which are similar to those required of antitrust plain-
tiffs. In order for a plaintiff to gain standing under the Clayton
Act, the plaintiff must prove an "antitrust injury," which is to say
"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent."'71
In light of Civil RICO's adoption of the antitrust treble damage
language, some courts maintain that the plaintiff must demonstrate
a distinct "RICO injury" in order to state a Civil RICO claim, in
other words, "the type of injury RICO was intended to prevent. '72
Accordingly, the requirement for a distinct injury, different from
the injury resulting from the predicate acts, was created.73 Further,
these courts contend there is nothing in Civil RICO's legislative his-
tory that suggests Congress did not intend to create analogous
standing barriers to Civil RICO by using the "injury by reason of"
language. Consequently, these courts conclude that standing
should only be granted to those who have suffered a racketeering
enterprise injury.74
The requirement of a distinct RICO injury-the type RICO was
intended to prevent-is vague and ambiguous. It could be inter-
preted to require an indirect injury. Inherent in the interpretation
full panoply of our antitrust machinery in the aid of business competing with organized
crime." Senator McClellan states: "The many references to antitrust cases are neces-
sary because particular equitable remedies desired have been brought to their greatest
development in this field and in many instances they are the primary precedents for the
remedies in this bill." Id. at 9567.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
69. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
70. See infra note 72.
71. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
72. Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (a racketeering
enterprise injury is required; injury "of the sort that RICO was enacted to remedy and
deter"); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983) ("a plaintiff must
allege not only injury arising from the predicate acts, but injury of the type that RICO
was intended to prevent"); Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(plaintiff must allege "injury the type that the RICO statute was intended to prevent").
73. Johnsons v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper v. New
Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan
v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Although RICO
does not require competitive injury, as defined by antitrust cases, the plaintiff must
allege a racketeering enterprise injury).
74. The legislative history has been read to support both sides of the argument.
This is in part attributable to the fact that the addition of the private right of action to
the preliminary draft of the RICO statute did not generate discussion in either the
House or Senate. Clute v. Davenport Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1573 (D. Conn. 1984).
See Note, Civil RICO, supra note 24, at 1101, 1112 n.62 (1982). See also supra note 66.
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of the antitrust treble damage clause 75 is the requirement of an indi-
rect injury. 76 Therefore, an analogy to the Clayton Act, based on
this clause, could only yield an indirect injury requirement. The
majority of courts, in addressing Civil RICO, have rejected the indi-
rect injury requirement 77 because Congress did not intend to limit
Civil RICO by antitrust concepts such as "competitive," "commer-
cial," "direct or indirect" injury.78 The application of antitrust
principles to Civil RICO, "flies in the face" of legislative intent.79
The only other reading that could be given to the distinct RICO
injury requirement in the context of antitrust law is the requirement
of an organized crime nexus. Civil RICO was intended to "address
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime."80
Thus, a RICO injury, the type RICO was intended to prevent,
would be an injury stemming from organized crime. However, the
courts have overwhelmingly rejected the requirement for a connec-
tion with organized crime.81 These courts adhere to the legislative
history stating that, in order for Civil RICO to pass constitutional
scrutiny, it must be construed as a conduct offense, rather than a
status offense. 82 Therefore, any analogy to antitrust law, which de-
mands the Civil RICO plaintiff be injured by the defendant affilia-
tion with organized crime, is the result of inconsistent and
constitutionally impermissible reasoning.
In addition to being vague, ambiguous and contrary to legislative
intent, the distinct injury requirement will lead to the anomalous
result of denying relief to direct victims of organized crime.8 3 For
example, members of organized crime who infiltrate an enterprise 84
and who conduct the affairs of the enterprise to defraud their cus-
75. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
76. An indirect injury is inherent in the interpretation of the antitrust treble dam-
age clause because an antitrust plaintiff must allege injury of the type the antitrust laws
are intended to prevent. Since the antitrust laws are intended to promote free competi-
tion and to prevent competitive injuries, which are indirect injuries, any analogy based
on the interpretation of the antitrust treble damage clause could only result in an indi-
rect injury requirement.
77. See supra note 24.
78. Blakey, Reflections, supra note 23, at 237, 255 n.52. (1982).
79. Id. See also Stafer, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: Everybody's Darling, 19
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 705-07 (1982); see also Note, Civil RICO, supra note 24, at
1101, 1109-10 (1982).
80. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981).
81. See supra note 23.
82. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See also 116 CONG. REC. 35,204
(1970); 116 CONG. Rac. 35, 343-46 (1970); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("the statute is not aimed at 'racketeers' . . . [i]nstead, it is aimed at 'racke-
teering' and even then only in the context of 'racketeering activity,' which Congress has
defined carefully and precisely in terms of conduct").
83. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157
(D.N.J. 1983)
84. For example, the enterprise might be a brokerage firm or a store.
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tomers may produce injury only to such customers. Based on the
antitrust analogy, these customers would be denied standing to sue
in those courts requiring a racketeering enterprise injury85 since
they would not have sustained an injury "distinct or different" from
the injury resulting from the predicate acts. 86 However, such con-
duct would "violate RICO and lie near the center of Congress' con-
cern."87 Section 1964(c) 88 was specifically adopted by Congress to
deter this very type of criminal activity and it is the responsibility of
the judicial system not to "create cracks through which the targeted
behavior will slip."89 Therefore, the standing requirement of a
racketeering enterprise injury, based on any analogy to the antitrust
treble damage clause, should be rejected.
The second justification offered by some courts for requiring a
racketeering enterprise injury is that Congress, in drafting Civil
RICO, did not intend to federalize pre-existing state laws. 90 These
courts9' refuse to allow standing to plaintiffs injured directly from
the predicate acts because they fear that Civil RICO will transform
traditional state offenses into federal offenses. 92
However, the language of Civil RICO93 and its legislative his-
tory94 reveal that "Congress was well aware that it was entering a
new domain of federal involvement through the enactment of
85. Civil RICO provisions would be limited to indirect victims, if there were any,
such as the extortionists' competitors. However, "we suspect that competing extortion-
ists would be unlikely to sue under Civil RICO." Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 391 n.10 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
87. Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
89. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
90. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977) ("RICO not
designed to punish state law violations"); Johnson v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 284
(C.D. Cal. 1982) ("Congress. . .did not intend to provide an additional remedy for an
already compensatible injury"); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp.
1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("no evidence that [RICO] was meant to pre-empt or
supplement the remedies already provided by those statutes which define a predicate
RICO offense"); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136
(D. Mass. 1982) (courts have restricted RICO in fear that a literal application of the
statute "would escort into federal court what have traditionally been civil actions pur-
sued in state court"); Adair v. Hunt Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("Congress did not envision RICO as an alternative and cumulative remedy").
91. See supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(a) (1982) provides: "[A]ny act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is charge-
able under State law." Id. (Emphasis added)
94. 116 CONG. REC. 35,217 (1970) (statements of Rep. Eckhardt). See also id. at
35,205 (statements of Rep. Mikva); Id. at 35,213 (statements of the American Civil
Liberties Union); Hearing on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 329, 370 (1970) (statement
of Sheldon H. Eisen on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
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[RICO]. 95 The evil ramifications of organized crime motivated
Congress to adopt a sweeping statute that "moves large substantive
areas formerly within the police power of the state into the federal
realm."' 96 Since Congress has considered this effect, the judiciary
should not be allowed to restrict Civil RICO in the name of
federalism.
Another related argument made by courts in support of a racke-
teering enterprise injury requirement is that Congress did not in-
tend to supplement the substantive statutes97 constituting
racketeering activity. These courts98 refuse to grant standing to
plaintiffs injured directly from the predicate acts because they main-
tain it is illogical to provide a private right of action for treble dam-
ages99 for exactly the same conduct punishable by the substantive
statutes. 0° One court stated: "It is incomprehensible that a plain-
tiff suing under securities law would receive one third the damages
of a plaintiff suing under RICO for the same injury."' 0 1
These courts ignore that the mere commission of a predicate of-
fense does not trigger the application of Civil RICO. 102 The reason-
ing used by these courts10 3 is deficient because it ignores the
primary elements constituting a Civil RICO cause of action: a
"pattern of racketeering activity"'1 4 and the existence of an "enter-
prise."' 05 To establish a pattern of racketeering activity, 10 6 the
plaintiff must prove the defendant committed two or more predi-
cate acts 0 7 in a certain manner'0 8 and within a specific time
95. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
96. Id. at 586-87.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
98. Generally, this argument is made by the courts to deny standing to a victim of
"garden variety fraud," e.g., mail, wire and securities fraud. Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("it was clearly established at the time
that RICO was enacted that there was no private right of action for violations of the
mail fraud statute"); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (Congress could not have intended to provide treble damage causes of
action to persons whose injury stems directly from the predicate acts alone); See also
Guerrero v. Katzan, 511 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983).
99. See supra note 98.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
101. Guerrero v. Katzan, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983).
102. See United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977).
103. See supra note 90.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
105. Id.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). See supra note 2.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
108. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (racketeering
activities may not be isolated, disconnected incidents, but must be connected with each
other by some common scheme, plan or motive). But see United States v. Elliot, 571
F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir. 1978) (racketeering activities must be related to conduct of the
enterprise but not necessarily related to each other).
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frame. 10 9 Furthermore, the existence of the "enterprise" is the sine
qua non 1 0 of a Civil RICO claim, and "at all times remains a sepa-
rate element that must be proved."' 11
The third justification given by some courts for requiring a racke-
teering enterprise injury is the courts' concern over their already
overcrowded dockets. 12 Due to the recent discovery of Civil
RICO, there has been an explosion of litigation.1' 3 Consequently,
these courts reason that if they allow standing to plaintiffs alleging
injury solely from the predicate acts, they will be inundated with
Civil RICO suits.
The additional burden of proving a racketeering enterprise injury,
however, contradicts the legislative intent behind Civil RICO.
When drafting Civil RICO, Congress realized that it was creating
revolutionary federal civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied
by state law.1 4 In fact, Congress deliberately extended the poten-
tial scope of Civil RICO in disregard of the specific objections made
which raised the issue of crowded court dockets.1 5 It is not the
role of the judicial system to stymie the broad reach of Civil
RICOI16 in order to alleviate their own administrative burden.
Therefore, the crowded court docket rationale requiring a racke-
teering enterprise injury should be accorded no weight.
The fourth justification given by some courts for requiring a rack-
eteering enterprise injury is based on the plain language of Civil
RICO. The plain meaning of Civil RICO has been interpreted by
some courts to necessitate a racketeering enterprise injury. " 7 These
courts1 18 read section 1964(c)" 9 as requiring "something more"
than merely an injury from the predicate acts. Section 1964(c)' 20
provides a civil remedy to "[a] person injured . . . by reason of a
violation of Section 1962."121 These courts' 2 2 find this language to
mean that the Civil RICO plaintiff must be injured not solely from
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). See supra note 2.
110. "That without which the thing cannot do. An indispensable requisite or condi-
tion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (5th ed. 1978).
111. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
112. Standing requirements imposed on antitrust plaintiffs have also been justified
on the ground that opening the doors to more suits would put too much of an adminis-
trative burden on the courts. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741 (1977).
113. The civil remedy was largely ignored for nearly a decade.
114. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
115. Id. at 587.
116. Id. at 586.
117. Bankers Trust Co. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984); Haroco v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 577 F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
118. Id.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
120. Id.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
122. See supra note 117.
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the predicate acts, 123 but from the behavior proscribed in Section
1962.124 In very general terms, Section 1962125 prohibits a "per-
son" 126 from engaging in two predicate acts to obtain an interest in
or to operate an enterprise. 127 Since Section 1962128 requires the
existence of an enterprise, these courts conclude an injury "by rea-
son of a violation of Section 1962"129 must be an injury from the
enterprise, the racketeering enterprise injury. Moreover, if Con-
gress had intended Section 1964(c) 130 to compensate victims di-
rectly injured by the predicate acts, it could have made reference to
the list of predicate acts 131 in addition to Section 1962.132
The better reasoned view is that the plain meaning of Civil RICO
does not require a racketeering enterprise injury. Concededly, an
injury sustained "by reason of a violation of Section 1962" 133 neces-
sarily involves two predicate acts 134 and the existence of an enter-
prise. 135 The requirement for the existence of an enterprise,' 36
however, is vastly different from the requirement that the plaintiff's
injury must result from or through the enterprise. 137 The simple
answer is that Congress did not write Civil RICO to require an in-
jury from or through an enterprise. 138 In most cases, the plaintiffs
injury will flow from the predicate acts as "the enterprise is merely
the means or vehicle through which those acts are accom-
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
125. Id.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). See supra note 2.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
128. Id.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
130. Id.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). See Comment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element
Back Into RICO Section 1962 and 1964(c), 76 N.W. L. REV. 100, 125-33 (1981).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). See supra note 2.
135. The concept of the enterprise may be divided into four broad categories: (1)
commercial entities (corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships); (2) benevolent or-
ganizations (unions, benefit funds, schools); (3) governmental units (the office of a gov-
ernor, a state legislator, a court, a prosecutor's office, a police or sheriff department, or
an executive department or agency); or (4) associations in fact (licit or illicit). See
Blakey, Reflections, supra note 23, at 237, 297-99 (1982).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982). See supra note 2.
137. See supra note 24.
138. Professor G. Robert Blakey points out that there seems to be two views of 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)-that of Congress' and that of some defense counsel and courts' (the
latter has interpreted § 1964(c) to read: "any person competitively injured by organized
crime in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter
distinct from any injury sustained from the commission of any racketeering activity...
shall . . . recover threefold damages . . . court costs and attorney's fees") Blakey,
RICO From Genesis to 1984 The Birth and Maturation of the Statute in RICO SECOND
STAGE, Tab N, 23 (1984) (hereinafter cited as RICO SECOND STAGE). (emphasis
added).
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plished."' 139 Congress provided in Section 1964(c) 140 unambiguous
language which is controlling in the absence of "a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary." 141 Section 1964(c)1 42 grants pri-
vate civil relief for "injury, which logically includes any injury," by
reason of a violation of Section 1962.143 Therefore, Section
1964(c) 144 should be read as simply requiring a Civil RICO plaintiff
to allege injury from the predicate acts to attain standing 45 to sue.
It is appropriate to examine In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Inc. Securities Litigation 4 6 which represents and supports the views
expressed above.
IV. THE RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE INJURY REJECTED
Catanella'47 is the most significant and well reasoned case to date
addressing the racketeering enterprise injury. 14 Catanella149 pro-
vides a thorough analysis of a racketeering enterprise injury and
rejects it as "vague and artificial."'' 50 The case concludes that in-
jury from the predicate acts is sufficient for a plaintiff to gain stand-
ing to sue in the federal courts.151
Multiple plaintiffs brought a Civil RICO cause of action against
Kenneth Catanella for alleged unlawful conduct in his dealings as a
securities broker and against his employer, E.F. Hutton & Co. for
failing to adequately supervise Catanella.' 52 Catanella was accused
of a continuing course of fraud in connection with his handling of
plaintiff's portfolios. 5 3 The allegations ran "the gamut from churn-
ing to the purchase of unsuitable securities and the failure to dis-
close the risk inherent in certain transactions."'' 54 To establish their
Civil RICO cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged that Catanella par-
139. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1984).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
141. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
143. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
145. Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). ("I can imagine no construction of [1964(c)] which would exclude from [its
coverage] the primary victims . . . and which would render. . . defendants immune
from civil sanctions").
146. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
147. Id.
148. Prof. G. Robert Blakey stated that Catanella provides "an excellent analysis of
the most recent district court arguments." RICO SECOND STAGE, supra note 138, at
Tab N, 26.
149. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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ticipated in the affairs of an "enterprise"-E.F. Hutton & Co.
through a "pattern of racketeering"-multiple acts of fraud.1 55 As
a defense to the Civil RICO charge, the defendants asserted that the
plaintiffs failed to allege the appropriate type of injury to establish
an injury "by reason of a violation of Section 1962."156 The defend-
ant maintained that the injuries sustained were only those flowing
from the commission of the predicate acts.157 Further, they con-
tended "some additional injury"; was required, and they advocated
the necessity of either an injury resulting from organized crime, a
competitive injury or a racketeering enterprise injury.158 The Cat-
anella court addressed and rejected each of the judicially imposed
standing barriers.159 Most importantly, the Catanella court refused
to engraft the elusive racketeering enterprise injury requirement
onto a Civil RICO cause of action. 60 It is necessary to probe this
court's rationale for renouncing the racketeering enterprise injury
requirement.
The Catanella court described a racketeering enterprise injury as
an "umbrella concept" or a "catch-all" term possibly encompassing
competitive, commercial, and infiltration injuries.161 Yet, the court
was cognizant that this enlarged definition, including any form of
indirect injury, did not remedy the basic flaw: a direct/indirect di-
chotomy "harkens back to an antitrust analogy"'162 which is "un-
tenable in light of RICO language and purpose."' 163 The court
exposed this basic flaw by way of an example:
Consider. . .threats made to induce a small grocer to pay...
for "protection services." The grocer is not in competition with
the vendors of this service. . . [n]o attempt is made to infiltrate
• ..the grocer's business. Nor is the grocer hampered in his
ability to compete. Imposition of an [indirect] injury require-
ment would prevent the grocer from suing under section
1964(c). . . . The grocer in the example is a direct victim of
racketeering activity. 164
Clearly, the grocer was injured by the members of the protection
ring, who operated the affairs of their "enterprise" through a "pat-
tern of racketeering"-repeated acts of extortion. However, since
the injuries suffered by the grocer were only those flowing from the
predicate acts of extortion, those courts requiring a racketeering en-




159. Id. at 1426-37.
160. Id. at 1434-37.
161. Id. at 1436.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1433.
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terprise injury would bar the grocer from recovering. The Cat-
anella court found this result inconsistent with the nature and
purposes behind the Civil RICO legislation. 165 First, "targeted be-
havior would go unpunished and the protection ring would not be
divested of its ill-gotten gains." 166 Second, by demanding injuries
that are greater or different from those sustained by the predicate
acts "is to imply that the damages must be indirect." 167 It is clear
from the legislative history that Civil RICO was not to be limited by
the pre-established body of law restricting the standing of antitrust
plaintiffs. 168
Lastly, the Catanella court made two meritorious observations
regarding the racketeering enterprise injury: first, those courts re-
quiring a racketeering enterprise injury have not defined the "pa-
rameters of this concept and it . . . [is] impossible to apply that
which defies definition;"'169 and second, perhaps the "most telling
fact about a racketeering enterprise injury is that none of the courts
requiring this special injury have found it to exist in any of the cases
before them."' 170 In other words, these courts have not adhered to
the broad sweep Congress intended Civil RICO to have, but have
succumbed to the temptation of substituting their own views as to
when the statute should be applied.
CONCLUSION
The judicial curtailing of Civil RICO stems from the courts' dis-
comfort with inflicting treble damages upon defendants who are not
involved in organized crime. The courts experiencing this uneasi-
ness have focused on the problem that gave rise to the Civil RICO
legislation-organized crime-rather than focusing on the statute
as promulgated by Congress.171 What these courts have overlooked
is that the scope of Civil RICO was intentionally expanded by Con-
gress to include white collar crime when Civil RICO was designed
to deter all conduct that endangers the legitimate functioning of
businesses.17 2 Today, due to the pervasiveness of white collar
crime, and to the serious threat it poses to the economy, the far-
ranging application of Civil RICO has come of age. The courts,
therefore, should stop trying to thwart Civil RICO's potential im-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1434-35.
168. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
169. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
170. Id.
171. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). See supra note 2.
172. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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pact by narrowly construing Section 1964(c) 173 to require a racke-
teering enterprise injury.
Moreover, a growing number of courts have come to recognize
the meaninglessness of the racketeering enterprise injury require-
ment as a standing barrier 74 to the Civil RICO plaintiff. A racke-
teering enterprise injury is unprincipled, impossible to define and
has been arbitrarily applied. Justifications given in support of it are
premised on forced analogies to antitrust law; misunderstandings of
Civil RICO's legislative intent and purposes; judicial overreactions
to crowded court dockets; and twisted interpretations of the statu-
tory language of Civil RICO.
There is not a scintilla of evidence in Civil RICO's expressed lan-
guage, nor in its legislative history, indicating that Congress envi-
sioned a racketeering enterprise injury requirement. Courts
straining to find such a requirement should start applying Civil
RICO instead of trying to redesign it. Civil RICO demands broad
judicial interpretation 175 by mandating a liberal construction to ef-
fectuate its remedial purpose. 176 To honor the liberal construction
clause, Section 1964(c) 177 should be read by the courts to require no
more than an allegation of injury from the predicate acts for the




173. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
174. Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 569 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
175. "We are mindful of the jurisprudential maxims that statutes are not to be inter-
preted woodenly and without regard to their aim; we do not see how any legitimate or
principled tailoring of RICO could be effectuated without impairing the broad strategy
embodied in the act." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
176. Organized Crime Control Act. 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947
(1970). The complete text states: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
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